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PLAINS COMMERCE BANK'S POTENTIAL COLLISION 
WITH THE EXPANSION OF TRIBAL COURT 
JURISDICTION BY SENATE BILL 3320 
The Honorable Patience Drake Roggensackt 
On June 25, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Plains Com-
merce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 1 in which it reaf-
firmed that civil tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is extremely 
limited when a claim against a non-tribal member is brought in a tri-
bal court. 2 On July 23, 2008, Senate Bill 3320 was introduced as the 
"Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008." A part of the bill seeks to ex-
pand the scope of the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts to include 
jurisdiction over non-tribal defendants. 3 
This article examines Plains Commerce Bank, as it explains in de-
tail the very limited nature of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction 
over a claim made against a non-tribal member defendant and 
grounds that limitation of tribal court jurisdiction in the U.S. Consti-
tution. The article then examines the potential guidance that Plains 
Commerce Bank offers to Congress as Congress considers Senate Bill 
3320, with its expansion of subject matter jurisdiction of criminal 
matters to include non-tribal member defendants. 
I. PLAINS COMMERCE BANK 
Plains Commerce Bank is the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent 
examination of civil subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts when a 
t The Honorable Patience Drake Roggensack is a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. She was elected to the court in 2003 and her current term expires July 31, 
2013. Justice Roggensack received a B.A. from Drake University and graduated from 
the University of. Wisconsin Law School. Prior to becoming a justice on the Supreme 
Court, she was a judge with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District N from August, 
1996 through July, 2003. Justice Roggensack has served as the Legislative Liaison 
for the Judicial Conference, on the Committee for Public Trust and Confidence in the 
Courts, on the Publication Committee for the Court of Appeals and as the court's del-
egate to the Personnel Review Board. She has also served as a co-chairperson for the 
State Court/Tribal Court Planning Committee, the 2005 Judicial Conference and the 
2005 Bench/Bar Conference. 
1. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008). 
2. !d. at 2718-19. 
3. Tribal Law and Order Act, S. 3320, 110th Cong. §§ 1, 401 (2008). 
29 
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claim is made against a non-tribal member. In Plains Commerce 
Bank, members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Longs4 and 
their ranching and farming corporation (hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as "the Longs"), sued a non-tribal member, Plains Com-
merce Bank (the Bank), in the Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court. 5 
The Longs, who had been customers ofthe Bank for many years, al-
leged that the Bank discriminated against them contrary to tribal law 
when the Bank sold non-tribal members land in which the Bank held 
a fee interest. 6 Although recognizing that suits against non-tribal 
members are not permitted in tribal courts unless they fit within one 
of the two exceptions set out in Montana v. United States, 7 the Longs 
alleged that the land sales had arisen directly from their preexisting 
commercial relationship with the Bank, and accordingly, the sales fell 
within the first exception to the general rule that tribes lack civil ju-
risdiction over non-tribal members. 8 
In Montana, the Supreme Court described two narrow circums-
tances in which a tribal court has potential jurisdiction over a claim 
against a non-tribal member defendant in a civil suit. 9 First, "[a] tribe 
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activi-
ties of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe 
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements." 10 Second, "[a] tribe may ... exercise civil au-
thority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reser-
vation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe." 11 
In Plains Commerce Bank, the Bank contended that the tribal court 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Longs' dis-
crimination claim. 12 The tribal court disagreed. 13 It concluded -that it 
4. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715. The Longs are enrolled members of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Tribe. !d. 
5. /d. 
6. /d. at 2714. Fee land differs from trust land in that fee land is "fully alienable" and 
free of tribal jurisdiction over its sale. /d. at 2719. 
7. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The two exceptions to the general prohibition against tribal 
courts exercising civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members described in Montana will 
be referred to in this article as the "Montana exceptions." 
8. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2720. 
9. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. 
10. /d. at 565. 
11. /d. at 566. 
12. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2715-16. 
13. /d. at 2716. 
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had jurisdiction and the case proceeded to trial. 14 A tribal jury found 
that the Bank had discriminated against the Longs in its sales of land, 
and it awarded the Longs $750,000 in damages. 15 The tribal court 
later supplemented the money judgment by awarding the Longs an 
option to purchase 960 acres of the fee land that the Bank once 
owned. 16 The tribal court's supplementation of the jury verdict "ef-
fectively nullifi[ed] the Bank's previous sale of that land to non-
Indians." 17 
The Bank appealed to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the tribal court, thereby exhausting the 
Bank's tribal court remedies. 18 The Bank then brought a declaratory 
judgment action in federal court, asserting that the judgment was void 
because the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate the discrimination claim against it. 19 The Supreme Court agreed 
with the Bank. 20 
The Court began by explaining that "whether a tribal court has ad-
judicative authority over nonmembers is a federal question." 21 
Therefore, whether jurisdiction exists over a claim against a non-
tribal member defendant is not a matter of tribal law, or a matter of 
state law. The Court acknowledged that Indian tribes are "distinct, 
independent political communities"22 and that they are "qualified to 
exercise many of the powers and prerogatives of self-government."23 
However, the Court pointed out that in regard to the attributes of so-
vereignty that the tribes retain, "many" is defmitely not "all."24 The 
Court noted that it has long held that the "sovereignty that the Indian 
14. !d. The Court did not relate the reasoning of the tribal court that caused it to conclude 




18. /d. At times, federal courts have required those who seek relief from the civil claims 
filed in tribal courts to exhaust tribal remedies before proceeding in federal court. 
See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987); Nat'! Farmers Union 
ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 ( 1985). But cj, El Paso Natural 
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 483 (1999) (holding the tribal exhaustion doctrine 
does not apply and the lower courts should not have abstained from answering the 
question presented). 
19. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2716. 
20. !d. at 2714. 
21. !d. at 2716-17 (citing Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 15; Nat'[ Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 
852-53). 
22. !d. at 2718 (citing Worcesterv. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,559 (1832)). 
23. !d. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)). 
24. !d. 
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tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. "25 Tribal sovereign-
ty is limited to tribal reservation land and to tribal members within 
the reservation. 26 The Court noted that "tribes retain authority to go-
vern 'both their members and their territory,' subject ultimately to 
[the will of] Congress." 27 Therefore, because the scope of tribal so-
vereignty is limited, a tribe's adjudicatory powers, which arise from 
tribal sovereignty, are limited as well. 
As examples of appropriate exercises of tribal sovereignty, the 
Court cited tribal taxation of activities taking place on a reservation, 28 
tribal regulation of domestic relations among tribal members, 29 and 
tribal exclusion of non-tribal members from tribal lands. 30 However, 
the Court was very strong in its declaration that, as a general rule, tri-
bes do not have adjudicative authority over claims against non-
Indians, even when non-tribal members come within the borders of a 
tribal reservation. 31 The Court explained that the tribes have lost 
'"the right of governing ... person[s] within their limits except them-
selves,"' by virtue of the tribes' incorporation into the American re-
public. 32 The Court also pointed out that the nature of tribal court ju-
risdiction over claims against a non-tribal member defendant is ex-
extremely limited when the subject of the dispute is land owned in 
fee by the defendant, as was the land sold by Plains Commerce 
Bank. 33 
The Court set out Montana's two limited exceptions to the general 
rule that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over claims against non-
tribal members by quoting portions of Montana and then explaining 
what those exceptions actually entailed. 34 The Court said that a 
"'tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, 
or other arrangements. "'35 The Court also said that a "tribe may ex-
ercise 'civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands 
within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct 
25. Id. (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323). 
26. !d. (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). 
27. !d. (quotingMazurie, 419 U.S. at 557). 
28. !d. (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985). 
29. Id. (citing Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 
387-89 (1976) (per curiam)). 
30. !d. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-97 (1990)). 
31. !d. at 2718-19 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). 
32. Id. at 2719 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,209 (1978)). 
33. See id. at 2720. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). 
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effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe. "'36 In its explanation, the Court carefully ca-
bined the two exceptions to prevent them from being interpreted 
broadly. 37 
For example, because of the limited nature of the sovereignty that 
the tribes retain and because subject matter jurisdiction is grounded in 
tribal sovereignty, the Court related that the analysis of a tribal 
court's exercise of civil subject matter jurisdiction over a claim 
against a defendant who is a non-tribal member begins with the pre-
sumption that an attempted exercise is not valid. 38 This is a critical 
factor in apprising tribal court jurisdiction when a tribal member 
seeks to bring a non-tribal member before a tribal court because the 
tribal member must prove that the defendant's conduct fits within one 
of the two Montana exceptions or there is no tribal court jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the claim. After setting this framework for its analysis, 
the Court began by examining the Longs' suit against the Bank under 
Montana's first exception to the general rule that tribal courts have 
no subject matter jurisdiction over claims against non-tribal mem-
bers. 39 
The Court quoted its earlier opinion in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 40 
wherein the Court held that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does 
not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."41 The Court reasoned that be-
cause a tribe could not legislate to set the terms or conditions under 
which a non-tribal member could sell its fee land, the Cheyenne Riv-
er Sioux Indian Tribe had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
Longs' claim that the sale of the Bank's land discriminated against 
the Longs. 42 The principle that if a tribe cannot legislate to govern 
the persons and conduct at issue, it cannot adjudicate claims arising 
out of that conduct, was important to the Court's explanation that the 
Montana exceptions are very narrow. Tying the scope of a tribe's 
subject matter jurisdiction to the scope of its legislative power is a 
very limiting concept of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction when 
36. !d. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
37. !d. at 2719-20. 
38. !d. at 2720 (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)). 
39. !d. at 2720-21. 
40. 520 u.s. 438 (1997). 
41. !d. at 453. In Plains Commerce Bank, there was no contention that the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Indian Tribe had the sovereign right to set the terms and conditions under 
which the Bank could sell the land that it held in fee. 128 S. Ct. 2709. 
42. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2720. 
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a tribe's legislative power is limited, as is the case in regard to fee 
land within a reservation. 43 
The Court also said that Montana's exceptions to the general rule 
that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over claims against non-tribal 
members may be applied only to "conduct inside the reservation that 
implicates the tribe's sovereign interests."44 The Court explained that 
in Montana, it had expressly limited the first exception to the '"ac-
tivities of nonmembers,' . . . necessary 'to protect tribal self-
government [and] to control internal relations. "'45 In response to the 
separate opinion of Justice Ginsburg, who questioned the majority 
opinion's reliance on "conduct" within a reservation as a necessary 
condition to the invocation of a Montana exception, the Court ex-
plained that "[t]he distinction between [a] sale of the land and con-
duct on it is well-established in our precedent ... and [is] entirely 
logical given the limited nature of tribal sovereignty and the liberty 
interests of nonmembers."46 The Bank had sold fee land. 47 There-
fore, the land itself was not reservation land, and the tribe had no au-
thority to regulate the terms or conditions of the sale of that land. 48 
Accordingly, tribal court subject matter jurisdiction over the tribe's 
discrimination claim against the Bank did not exist under the first 
Montana exception. 49 
In regard to the second Montana exception that may apply to "non-
Indians' 'conduct' [that] menaces the 'political integrity, the econom-
ic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe, "'50 the Court noted 
that one commentator concluded that such conduct could be regulated 
by a tribe in the exercise of its sovereignty only if such exercise of 
tribal power was "'necessary to avert catastrophic consequences. "' 51 
The Court concluded that the sale of fee land would not have a "cata-
strophic" effect on the tribe and therefore, the sale formed no basis 
for the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction over a claim against a non-
43. Other commentators have also observed that the concept that the judicial powers of a 
tribe are coextensive with its legislative powers is "profoundly limiting" of tribal court 
jurisdiction. Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Para-
meters of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539, 569-
70 (1997). 
44. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2721 (emphasis in original). 
45. !d. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981)). 
46. !d. at 2723. 
47. !d. at 2715. 
48. See id. at 2719. 
49. See id. 
50. !d. at 2726 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
51. !d. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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tribal member defendant under Montana's second exception. 52 Re-
quiring that a non-tribal defendant's conduct have a catastrophic ef-
fect on the tribe before a tribe could regulate that conduct under Mon-
tana's second exception placed a very strict limit on tribal use of the 
second Montana exception. 
However, notwithstanding the Court's careful analysis of Mon-
tana's exceptions, the central concern that drives the Court's decision 
in Plains Commerce Bank is the Court's discussion of the rights se-
cured by the U.S. Constitution that are available to a defendant in 
federal court, but are not available in tribal court. Stated otherwise, 
the unavailability of those constitutional rights that a defendant has in 
federal court, but not in tribal courts, was the lens through which the 
Court examined the Longs' and the Bank's contentions relative to 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
In this regard, the Court first voiced its concern about a litigant's 
constitutional rights in response to Justice Ginsburg's query about the 
majority opinion's requirement of non-tribal member conduct on tri-
bal land as a precondition to jurisdiction. The Court explained that 
conduct by a non-tribal member that occurs on tribal land is neces-
sary to invoke a Montana exception because tribal sovereignty is of 
such a limited nature. 53 The Court also noted that because "the liber-
ty interests of nonmembers" are at issue when considering the scope 
of subject matter jurisdiction of a tribal court over a claim against a 
non-tribal member, non-tribal member conduct that occurs on tribal 
land is necessary before a tribe's sovereign interest is affected, which 
has the potential to support jurisdiction. 54 Furthermore, while such 
conduct is necessary for subject matter jurisdiction, it may not be suf-
ficient to support jurisdiction in all cases. 55 That is, not all conduct 
by a non-tribal defendant that occurs on tribal land will be sufficient 
to support subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. 56 The 
conduct must also fit within one of Montana's two exceptions. 57 
The Court later amplified its concern for the constitutional rights of 
a non-tribal member defendant in greater detail when it explained that 
broadly interpreting Montana's exceptions would impinge on indi-
vidual rights in defmed ways. 58 For example, the Court explained 
52. !d. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. at 2722-23. 
55. !d. at 2726. 
56. !d. 
57. !d. at 2719-20. 
58. !d. at 2724. 
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that permitting tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction would "run[] the 
risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without 
commensurate consent."59 The Court noted that non-tribal members 
have no part in tribal government-they have no say in the 
laws and regulations that govern tribal territory. Conse-
quently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed 
on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented [to 
tribal court jurisdiction] either expressly or by his actions. 
Even then, the regulation must stem from the tribe's inhe-
rent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve 
tribal self-government, or control internal relations. 60 
The Court also reaffirmed that tribal sovereignty is "'outside the 
basic structure of the Constitution. "'61 Most significantly, the Court 
pointed out that "[t]he Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tri-
bes."62 
With the Court's concerns about the inapplicability of the U.S. 
Constitution to proceedings in tribal courts and the effect that this has 
on non-tribal member defendants in tribal courts during a civil suit, I 
now turn to the proposed expansion of criminal jurisdiction in tribal 
courts that is presently pending in Congress as Senate Bill 3320. If 
enacted into law, the bill would permit criminal subject matter juris-
diction in tribal courts over non-tribal member defendants. 
II. SENATE BILL 3320 
On July 23, 2008, Senate Bill 3320 was introduced to amend the 
Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, the Indian Tribal Justice Act, 
the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of2000, 
and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The 
short title for the bill, should it become law, will be the "Tribal Law 
and Order Act of2008."63 
The avowed purpose of the bill was "to improve the prosecution of, 
and response to, crimes in Indian country, and for other purposes." 64 
One of the stated purposes of the bill is to reduce crime on Indian 
reservations, which is represented in the bill to be of epic propor-
59. !d. 
60. !d. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). 
61. !d. (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)). 
62. !d. (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896)). 
63. S. 3320, !lOth Cong. § l(a) (2008). 
64. !d. pmbl. 
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tions. 65 The bill contains several provisions to further the goal of 
crime reduction on tribal reservations. It provides for hiring more 
law enforcement officers at federal expense to work on tribal land, 66 
for constructing tribal prisons at federal expense to incarcerate those 
convicted of crimes by tribal courts, 67 and for expanding the criminal 
jurisdiction and sentencing authority of tribal courts. 68 
A tribal court has criminal jurisdiction over its own tribal members 
and also over members of other American Indian tribes for conduct 
that occurs on tribal land. 69 A tribal court's criminal jurisdiction over 
members of American Indian tribes can result in incarceration of no 
more than one year or a $5,000 fine. 70 Senate Bill 3320 expands po-
tential incarceration to three years and raises the maximum fme to 
$15,000. 71 Currently, tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian citizens. 72 The bill's expansion of criminal jurisdiction in 
tribal courts to include criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens 
is the area of my concern. 
Although tribes do retain the general authority to govern their 
members while on tribal land, Congress has plenary power to limit 
that authority. 73 Furthermore, the "exercise of tribal power beyond 
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control inter-
nal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, 
and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation" of 
authority to the tribes. 74 
65. !d. § 2; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N No. 
NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (2004) (a statistical profile highlighting 
the disturbing crime rates affecting American Indians). 
66. S. 3320, § 305(c)(l). 
67. Id. § 404(b). 
68. See id. § 201 (stating the proposed changes to allow tribal courts to maintain concur-
rent jurisdiction with the federal government over crimes committed on Indian land). 
69. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
70. 25 U.S. C. § 1302 (2006) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall ... (7) ... impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment 
greater than imprisonment for a term of one year [or] a fine of $5,000, or both .... "). 
71. S. 3320, § 304(3). 
72. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (explaining that a tribe's lack of 
power to try a nonmember rests on the dependent status of Indian tribes within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (concluding that by "submitting to the overriding sovereignty of 
the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily [gave] up their power to try non-
Indian citizens of the United States .... "). 
73. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2718 
(2008) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). 
74. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
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Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts to 
prosecute crimes committed on tribal land by tribal members. 75 If a 
tribal court convicts a tribal member of committing a crime, prosecu-
tion in federal court for the same act that resulted in a conviction by a 
tribal court does not invoke double jeopardy concerns due to the sep-
arate sovereigns doctrine. 76 Accordingly, under current federal law, a 
tribal member could be convicted of armed robbery and receive a 
one-year sentence in tribal court and also be prosecuted and con-
victed in federal court, and receive a significantly longer sentence. 
At the present time, Congress has not granted tribal courts criminal 
subject matter jurisdiction over non-tribal members. 77 Crimes com-
mitted by non-tribal members on tribal land must be prosecuted in 
federal court, 78 unless the tribal land is located in a Public Law 280 
state. 79 In Public Law 280 states, state courts have subject matter ju-
risdiction over crimes committed by all persons on tribal land. 80 Ab-
sent Public Law 280 status, a crime committed by a non-tribal mem-
ber against either an Indian or another non-tribal member on an 
Indian reservation is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. 81 
There is good reason for the limits on the criminal jurisdiction of 
tribal courts. First, it has long been the rule that the Bill of Rights 
75. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(granting tribal courts power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians); 18 
U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006) (establishing as federal crimes fifteen major crimes commit-
ted by an Indian on an Indian reservation); 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (providing that Indians 
who are charged with an offense under § 1153(a) "shall be tried in the same courts 
and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such offense within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States"); 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (conferring on federal 
courts criminal jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed within Indian country). 
76. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210 (concluding that Lara's prosecution in both tribal court and in 
federal court for the assault of a federal officer on tribal land did not raise double jeo-
pardy concerns). 
77. Nat') Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853-54 (1985) 
(reaffirming that the federal law that "confer[s] jurisdiction on the federal courts to try 
non-Indians for offenses committed [on reservation land] implicitly pre-empt[s] tribal 
jurisdiction"); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204 (concluding that as between tribal courts and 
federal courts, Congress has reserved criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the 
federal courts). 
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
79. Id.§1162. 
80. /d. Public Law 280 provides for concurrent state court jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted and civil causes of action arising on tribal land. /d.; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000). 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. However, due to an act of Congress, tribal court criminal jurisdic-
tion does include jurisdiction over other Indians who may not be a member of the 
prosecuting Indian tribe. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197-98. 
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does not constrain Indian tribes and their courts. 82 As early as 1896, 
in Talton v. Mayes, the Supreme Court explained that because tribal 
sovereignty predates the Constitution, tribal courts are not required to 
apply the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. 83 One could argue 
that because Talton is such an old case, it may no longer be good law. 
However, the Supreme Court affirmed Talton in Plains Commerce 
Bank, decided in June of 2008. 84 ·Therefore, it remains the law that 
tribal courts are not required to adhere to the restrictions on govern-
mental actions that the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution man-
dates for state and federal courts. 85 
The absence of the Bill of Rights from tribal courts is also a disad-
vantage for tribal members that has been recognized by Congress. 86 
Therefore, because of concerns that have been raised about the lack 
of civil rights available to tribal members who were brought before 
tribal courts as criminal defendants, Congress passed the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. 87 However, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not 
provide all of the personal rights that are found in the Bill of Rights, 
but instead provides as follows: 
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to peti-
tion for a redress of grievances; 
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
search and seizure[], nor issue warrants, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the person or thing to 
be seized; 
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy; 
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself; 
82. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2724 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 
382-85 (1896)). 
83. Talton, 163 U.S. at 382-85. 
84. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2724. 
85. See id. 
86. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978). 
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). 
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(5) take any private property for a public use without just 
compensation; 
( 6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a 
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assis-
tance of counsel for his defense; 
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fmes, inflict 
cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for 
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment 
greater than imprisonment for a term of one year [or] a fme 
of$5,000, or both; 
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or proper-
ty without due process of law; 
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or 
( 1 0) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by 
imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of 
not less than six persons. 88 
An analysis of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, even a cursory review shows that it 
does not provide the same rights as does the U.S. Constitution. For 
example, assistance of counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing is required under the Indian Civil Rights Act only at a defendant's 
"own expense." 89 
Furthermore, the Indian Civil Rights Act has no "establishment 
clause" in regard to religion, as is provided in the First Amendment. 90 
As a result of the lack of an establishment clause in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, tribal courts are not required to separate religion, or "tra-
dition" as it is often called, from the exercise of tribal authority in tri-
bal court. 91 As tribal Judge Roman J. Duran, the first Vice President 
of the National American Indian Court Judges Association, explained 
in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
"each tribe to a certain degree operates on a theocratic form of gov-
ernment; such that there is no separation of 'Church' and 'State', 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. Jn regard to religious freedoms, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
91. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 63. 
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whereby custom and tradition is the choice of law on a consistent and 
daily basis."92 It is beyond dispute that a central tenet of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is the prohibition of state estab-
lishment of religion. 
Second, non-tribal members have no say in tribal governance. 
They have not chosen to give up any ofthe constitutional protections 
accorded to a defendant in a criminal proceeding in federal or state 
court when they are hauled into tribal court. 
Third, there is no power of review of tribal court decisions by way 
of the usual federal structure for review of criminal convictions. To 
have the conviction of a crime in tribal court reviewed, a defendant 
must commence a separate federal court action. This is generally 
done by way of a habeas petition. 93 As Justice Kennedy recognized, 
"[t]he political freedom guaranteed to citizens by the federal structure 
is a liberty both distinct from and every bit as important as those 
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill ofRights."94 
If Senate Bill 3320 becomes law, non-tribal member defendants 
may be forced to proceed in tribal court without the constitutional 
rights provided to criminal defendants by the United States Constitu-
tion or in Public Law 280 states, rights provided by the state constitu-
tion where the tribal land is located. I am not persuaded that increas-
ing the criminal subject matter jurisdiction oftribal courts will reduce 
the number or types of crimes committed on tribal lands. However, 
even if I were to accept that it may do so, can any law, federal, state 
or tribal, be permitted to reduce the constitutional guarantees to 
which all are entitled? 
III. CONCLUSION 
Congress should deliberate carefully on Senate Bill 3320. While 
crime on tribal land is a real problem that must be addressed, increas-
ing the subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts has the potential to 
92. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1-
2 (July 24, 2008) (statement of Roman J. Duran, Vice President, National American 
Indian Court Judges Association). 
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any 
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of 
an Indian tribe."); see, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 709 (1990); Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69-70 (1978); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Sene-
ca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1996); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 824-26 
(9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Or., 
783 F.2d 1409, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986). 
94. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,214 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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create additional problems of constitutional dimension. Therefore, 
even though Plains Commerce Bank involves the examination of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in a civil law context, it provides a well-
reasoned framework for significant constitutional concerns. Consid-
eration of Plains Commerce Bank will aid the examination of Senate 
Bill 3320's proposed changes in the subject matter jurisdiction oftri-
bal courts in criminal cases. It should not be overlooked in Congress' 
deliberative process. 
